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Trademark "Coexistence" Agreements:
Legitimate Contracts or Tools of Consumer
Deception?
Marianna Moss*
Abstract
Coexistence agreements allow potentially confusing
trademarks to coexist in the market without trademark infringement
lawsuits. Although competitors frequently use coexistence
agreements to avoid or settle lawsuits, there is no significant
scholarship discussing the legal validity of such agreements in terms
of antitrust and trademark law. This paper discusses the validity of
coexistence agreements between manufacturers of similar products.
The discussion begins with historical reasons for trademark
protection and goes on to explore whether trademarks are the
property of their "owners." The validity of coexistence agreements
hinges on this concept. If trademarks are property of their "owners,"
then coexistence agreements are valid despite the possible harm to
the public interest. If, on the other hand, trademarks are not their
"owners"' true property, then, in evaluating the validity of
coexistence agreements, courts should consider the agreements'
usefulness or possible harm to the public.
Another relevant aspect of trademark law is the law and
economics of trademark protection. The main effect of trademark
protection in terms of economics is the reduction of consumer search
costs. If manufacturers keep the quality of their product constant,
then consumers will use a trademark as a proxy for the product's
quality. This gives manufacturers an incentive to invest in and
maintain their products' quality.
Next, the paper explores views of various international
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tribunals on the validity of coexistence agreements. Courts'
interpretations vary from validating an agreement based solely on its
terms without considering public interest to invalidating an otherwise
legitimate agreement because it violates public policy. The proposed
explanation for this difference is that courts consider the type of
products subject to a coexistence agreement. If fashion items are
involved, the courts will not consider public interest even if the
trademarks are confusingly similar. If, on the other hand, the product
in question is medication, courts will invalidate a coexistence
agreement between manufacturers who own confusingly similar
marks to protect public health.
The next section of the paper discusses antitrust implications
of coexistence agreements. Generally, coexistence agreements do not
violate antitrust laws, but they nevertheless may affect competition
between manufacturers of similar products. Two possible aspects of
competition affected by coexistence agreements are the price and
quality of products. However, the effect of a coexistence agreement
on quality and price is unpredictable. Depending on the behavior of a
manufacturer, a coexistence agreement may increase or lower the
price of a product; the same goes for the product's quality.
Finally, the paper concludes that, in evaluating the validity of
coexistence agreements, courts should consider public interest based
on a sliding scale. The more vital the public interest implicated by
the agreement (such as public health), the more strictly should the
court scrutinize it. The standard for invalidating an agreement in case
of a vital public interest is the likelihood of confusion. If the
trademarks involved in the agreement are likely to be confusing to
the public, the agreement should be invalidated. Conversely, if the
trademarks involved are not likely to cause public confusion, then the
court should allow the agreement to stand.
I. Introduction
Gerry and Lisa are newlyweds approaching their first
anniversary. Lisa has always wanted to own a genuine Gucci
handbag, and she thinks that she can make her dream a reality by
dropping Gerry subtle hints. She leaves on Gerry's desk issues of
Vogue open to the page with her dream bag. Gerry loves his wife
very much, and he quickly catches on to why, wherever he goes, he
sees a magazine open to a page displaying the same handbag. That
weekend he went to the Bloomingdale's handbag section and bought
a bag that looked like the one Lisa wanted. Proud of his
thoughtfulness, he triumphantly presented the gift to Lisa on their
[Vol. 18:2
Trademark "Coexistence" Agreements
anniversary. Anxious to see whether Gerry got the hint, Lisa opened
the box, saw the bag, felt a momentary joy, and then spent the rest of
the evening trying to suppress tears because the bag was Coach, not
Gucci. It certainly looked like the one she wanted, and she could not
blame Gerry for making that mistake, but it was not the Gucci purse
she dreamed of.
The example above illustrates the potential problem with
coexistence agreements. Gucci and Coach logos are very similar.
Both companies have handbags in the same shape, color and size.
Normally, such similarity in logos leading to consumer confusion
would result in a lawsuit for trademark infringement by one of the
companies. However, in this case, Gucci and Coach entered into a
coexistence agreement allowing both parties to use their logo on their
merchandise in spite of the possibility of consumer confusion. This
paper will discuss the legitimacy of such agreements and their effect
on consumers.
An important reason for trademark protection is preventing
consumer confusion. Nevertheless, registrations for similar marks in
the same product category exist. For example, the marks for Chanel,
Gucci, and Coach are similar, and they are all valid. All three
companies manufacture fashion products like handbags, clothes,
shoes and cosmetics.
In order to coexist in the market "peacefully," companies with
potentially infringing trademarks sometimes enter into coexistence
agreements, which allow them to continue marketing their products
to the public without the fear of defending a trademark infringement
lawsuit.
The legitimacy of coexistence agreements depends on several
factors. One side of the coin is consumer confusion; if coexistence
agreements allow confusing marks to exist in the market, then such
agreements undermine the original purpose of trademark law -
consumer protection. Another aspect of the issue is whether
trademarks are the property of their owners. If the manufacturers
own trademarks in the same way people own property, then
coexistence agreements are legitimate. In other words, if trademarks
are property, then the law's primary concern is protecting the rights
of property owners, not the public. On the other hand, if trademark
protection exists for the benefit of the consumers, then coexistence
agreements that impact consumers adversely lose their legitimacy and
should not be allowed.
Further, coexistence agreements possibly violate antitrust
laws. If coexistence agreements have the effect of reducing
competition in the way proscribed by antitrust laws, then they may be
20051
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simply illegal. Even if technically these agreements are within the
bounds of antitrust laws, they may still reduce competition among
manufacturers of similar products to the public's detriment.
Part I of this paper will explore the historical reasons for
trademark protection, and discuss whether trademarks are property.
Part II will discuss the possible anticompetitive effects of coexistence
agreements; how they affect the public and their validity in terms of
antitrust laws. Finally, the paper will conclude with a discussion of
whether coexistence agreements are legal, and if so, whether they are
beneficial or detrimental to the consumer. The paper will make a
recommendation on how courts should scrutinize coexistence
agreements.
II. Trademark protection
Currently, trademark protection is provided under the Lanham
Act. In order to get protection under the Act, the owner must register
the mark with the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO").' If the
mark is not registered with the PTO, the owner can get relief for
infringement under the common law. Historically, however,
common law rights were all trademark owners had to protect them.
A. Historical Reasons for Trademark Protection
Historically, trademark protection law has its origin in the law
of unfair competition. 2 In order to prevail in a claim for unfair
competition, a provider of goods or services would have to show that
another merchant made a material misrepresentation relating to his
goods or services that was likely to mislead consumers. 3 There were
two reasons for trademark protection. The law aimed to protect
consumers from confusion, and to protect merchants from free-riders
who could hijack the goodwill of the product to sell their own.4
However, the common law rights were limited. They were confined
1 Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057 (2000).
2 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 cmt. e (1995)
(stating that the protection of trademarks and other indicia of origin or sponsorship
is a fundamental of the law of unfair competition).
3 See id. § 2. See also id. § 3 cmt. b (defining materiality).
4 See Rudolph Callman, Unfair Competition Without Competition?, 95 U.
PENN. L. REv. 443, 445 (1947) (stating that unfair competition "affords relief
wherever, by reason of an unjustifiable act, the goods of one party to the suit will
probably be accepted by the purchasing public as the goods of another").
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to instances where "the junior user is competing with the senior user
and has imitated the mark in order to trade on the senior user's
goodwill.,
5
B. Are Trademarks Property?
Scholars have debated whether trademarks are property of
their owners. Whether trademarks are property may affect the
legitimacy of coexistence agreements. If trademarks are property,
then their owners may use them as they wish, including entering into
agreements allowing for coexistence of confusingly similar marks. In
other words, property rights trump public rights. If, on the other
hand, trademarks are not property, then the legitimacy of coexistence
agreements depends on how such agreements affect public welfare.
Freedom of contract is still important, but in certain cases,
coexistence agreements may be declared to be against public policy.
6
1. Arguments for "Trademarks Are Property" View
Supporters of the trademarks as property approach argue that
(1) trademarks have intrinsic value separate from the value of the
company; (2) genericide may be likened to eminent domain; and (3)
owners may license or assign trademarks in gross if the mark is
famous.
Trademarks, like real property, have intrinsic value of their
own. For example, the value of the Coca-Cola trademark alone is
$72,537,000. 7  Companies like Coca-Cola, McDonalds, Nike and
Microsoft invest large sums of money into strengthening and
promoting their marks, and their success should be rewarded with
legal Irotection similar to the legal protection afforded to property
rights. Further, "[b]y granting ownership rights over trademarks, we
5 Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 765
(1990).
6 See infra Part III(a).
7 Netmark Patent & Trademark (2004), http://www.netmarkpatent.com/eng/
misyon.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
8 See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach,
35 COLUM. L. REv. 809, 815 (1935) (stating that the argument for treating
trademarks as property is that "[o]ne who ... has induced consumer responsiveness
to a particular name.., has thereby created a thing of value; a thing of value is
property; the creator of property is entitled to protection against third parties who
seek to deprive him of his property").
2005]
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serve the twin goals of encouraging investment in product quality and
preventing consumer deception."
9
In addition, trademark law recognizes the concept of
genericide. Genericide occurs when a trademark becomes so
common that it enters the everyday English language and becomes
the most efficient way to describe the product.' 0 If that happens, the
mark loses legal protection.." The rationale is that the public has a
right to efficient expressions, and that public right to the now-generic
name outweighs the mark owner's right to legal protection of the
mark. 12
The concept of genericide has an equivalent in real property:
the eminent domain. According to the eminent domain principle, if a
piece of land is required for public use, the owner of that propert 3
loses the ownership, and that property belongs to the public.
Scholars have likened the genericide concept in trademark law to the
eminent domain concept in real property law. 14
The final argument for the trademarks as property approach is
that if a mark is famous, its owner can license its use to others
without conveying its goodwill 15 and other assets.16 For instance,
sports fans wear shirts with their team logos. The team in question
9 Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999).
'o See Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property is
Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 715, 722 (1993) (stating that "a trademark, even
a very successful one, can become generic, should it lose its distinctive character
and become an ordinary part of the market language").
1 Id.
12 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 271-73 (1987).
13 Id.
14 See id. (pointing out the analogy of genericide to eminent domain, but
stating that if genericide is to be treated as eminent domain, the owner should be
compensated).
15 Infoplease, www.infoplease.com/ipd/A0460423.html (last visited October
18, 2005) (defining "goodwill" as "an intangible, salable asset arising from the
reputation of a business and its relations with its customers, distinct from the value
of its stock and other tangible assets").
16 See Lemley, supra note 9, at 1706-07 (discussing merchandizing rights and
their effect on trademark law; stating that "the effect of... merchandizing right is
to give trademark "owners" something they have never traditionally had: the right
to control the use of the mark in totally unrelated circumstances").
202 [Vol. 18:2
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does not make shirts or any other products bearing the team logos.
Instead, the team licensed the use of the mark to a clothes
manufacturer who is otherwise unaffiliated with the team. This
ability of famous mark owners to license their trademarks in gross
represents another way law treats trademarks as property. If the
"trademarks are property" view prevails, then coexistence agreements
are legitimate, since in most cases, property rights trump public
rights.
2. Arguments for "Trademarks are Not Property" View
The opposing view holds that trademark protection exists to
benefit the public, even though their owners reap considerable profits
from using them. The rationale is that trademarks exist to protect the
public from consumer fraud, 17 lower the consumer search costs, 18 and
not to benefit their owners directly. The fact that mark owners
benefit a great deal from successful trademarks does not change the
fact that the mark is not, strictly speaking, their property. The
Holmes-Hand doctrine of a "qualified nature" of property in a
trademark is that "a trade-mark is only a symbol of the good will of
the business of the trade-mark owner."1 9  The proponents of the
"trademarks are not property" approach cite the following arguments
to support their case: (1) trademarks return to the public domain if not
used; (2) trademark owners may not license a trademark without the
accompanying product;20 (3) trademark protection applies only if the
mark is attached to the product; (4) if a mark becomes generic, it falls
into the public domain; (5) there is no incentive to create more
trademarks; (6) trademarks do not always belong to the first user; and
(7) entering into coexistence agreements may diminish the
distinctiveness of a mark and allow third parties to use similar marks.
When a trademark is not used for a certain period of time, it is
considered abandoned, and returns to the public domain where
others may begin using it.21 If trademark protection rights attached
for creation of trademarks and not their use to distinguish a product,
17 See id. at 1695 (stating that trademark protection exists "for one basic
reason: to enable the public to identify easily a particular product from a particular
source").
18 See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 269.
'9 See Callman, supra note 4, at 458.
20 See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 284.
21 See Carter, supra note 10, at 720.
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there would be no reason for the use requirement before the rights
attached. On the other hand, barring adverse possession,23 a real
property owner may visit his property once a year for a week or once
in ten years for a day without losing ownership rights to that
property. This difference cuts against treating trademarks as
property.
Furthermore, barring famous trademark licensing discussed
above, a mark owner may not license a mark without also licensing
the product identified by that mark.24 Allowing free transferability of
a trademark would defeat the purpose of trademark protection,
25namely, enabling consumers to identify a product source. When
famous mark owners license their marks, the products bearing the
famous marks are not the same as the original product identified by
that mark. For example, Coca-Cola is undeniably a famous mark, but
the company may not license its name to another soft drink producer
without also licensing the right to make the soft drink. This
restriction on alienability of rights runs contrary to real property law
under which the owner may divide his bundle of rights as he
wishes.
26
Trademark protection applies only if the mark is attached to a
product. A company that invents a beautiful mark will not receive
legal protection for it unless the mark identifies some product or
service. Doing otherwise would render the main reason for
trademark protection - prevention of consumer confusion -
completely ineffective. The entire purpose behind trademark
protection is to allow consumers to identify the source of a product
by recognizing the mark borne by the product. If a mark exists
independent from a product, it does not serve to protect the public
22 Id. at 722.
23 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 59 (8th ed. 2004) (defining adverse
possession as "[t]he use or enjoyment of real property with a claim of right when
that use or enjoyment is continuous, exclusive, hostile, open, and notorious").
24 See Irene Calboli, Trademark Assignment "With Goodwill": A Concept
Whose Time Has Gone, 57 FLA. L. REv. 771, 773 (2005).
25 See Lemley, supra note 9, at 1696 (stating that giving trademarks "some of
the indicia of real property, such as free transferability - defeats the purpose of
linking trademarks to goods in the first place").
26 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1252 (8th ed. 2004) (defining bundle of
rights as "[t]he right to possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing (either a tract of
land or a chattel); the right of ownership").
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from product confusion. 27 Contrary to this condition for protection,
the rights of real property owners are protected regardless of how
they use the property.
A trademark may also lose legal protection if it is too
successful. If a mark becomes so ubiquitous that the public uses it to
identify all products of a certain type rather than the products
manufactured by the owner of the mark, the mark will enter the
public domain and lose legal protection. 28  As Judge Kozinski
eloquently stated, "[w]ords and images do not worm their way into
our discourse by accident; they're generally thrust there by well-
orchestrated campaigns intended to burn them into our collective
consciousness.,, 29 Although some argue that this feature of trademark
law is equivalent to the eminent domain concept of real property,30 it
is another way that trademark owners do not have complete control
over their trademarks, and thus, arguably, are not true "owners" of
their marks. Further, if the government takes someone's property
under the eminent domain rule, it must compensate the owner fairly
for the property. 31 Contrary to the eminent domain's requirement of
just compensation, the government does not compensate the owners
of trademarks that enter public domain. This lack of compensation
requirement is another indication that trademarks are not truly their
owners' property.
In addition, the reason for legal protection of trademarks is
27 But see J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 2 § 18:25 (4 th
ed. 2005) (stating that a service mark can be transferred without tangible assets as
long as the new owner of the mark provides services similar to those provided by
the old owner of the mark). See also Visa, U.S.A., Inc. v. Birmingham Trust Nat'l
Bank, 696 F.2d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983)
(upholding the validity of assignment of a mark for check cashing services without
a transfer of tangible assets).
28 See Murphy Door Bed Co., Inc. v. Interior Sleep Systems, Inc., 874 F.2d 95,
101 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the term "Murphy bed" has become generic and
entered public domain).
29 Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 960, 975
(1993).
30 See Carter supra note 10, at 722.
31 See Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington, 538 U.S. 216, 231 (2003)
(stating that the state may confiscate private property if it satisfies the public use
and just compensation requirements). See also Carter, supra note 10, at 722
(stating that "if genericide is like eminent domain, then the rest of the takings
equation must follow as well: the owner should be compensated for the value of the
property lost!").
2005]
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not so that more trademarks enter the market. 32 On the contrary,
having fewer marks (up to a certain point) may benefit the public,
because it prevents public confusion. With so many brands of the
same product available, consumers spend more time, and thus incur
higher costs, in choosing the suitable one. Rather, "the law
encourages the development of goodwill and the association of that
goodwill with a mark., 33 In contrast, real property ownership is
encouraged so that land is put to useful exploitation in the country.
Trademarks do not always belong to the first person to use
them.34 The law confers protection only to those trademarks that are
actually in use; registering a mark for the purpose of preventing
others from using it is illegal. 35 Lemley cited examples of "legal
entrepreneurs" registering such phrases as "Class of 2000," "Titanic,"
and a smiley face and stated that infringement actions for the use of
those marks would be frivolous.36
Finally, entering into a coexistence agreement may diminish
the distinctiveness of a mark and allow third parties to use similar
marks in the same industry. For instance, in MGW Group Inc. v.
Gourmet Cookie Bouquets.com, the National Arbitration Forum held
that because petitioner had entered into a coexistence agreement with
a third party who had a similar trademark, it could not claim that
respondent's use of a similar mark would confuse the public.37 This
decision essentially created an estoppel on trademark infringement
claims for companies who enter into coexistence agreements with
direct competitors and stipulate in the agreement that the marks are
not confusing. The court's holding is contrary to real property law: if
a property owner gives neighbor A an easement on the property, it
does not stop him from suing neighbor B for trespassing.
If the "trademarks are not property" view prevails, then the
legitimacy of coexistence agreements will depend on whether they
sufficiently violate public policy to be declared illegitimate in spite of
32 See Carter, supra note 5, at 768.
33 Id.
34 See Lemley, supra note 9, at 1696.
35 Id. at 1696-97 (stating that "[t]rademark law protects source identification;
it does not allow people to own designs or phrases outright and to prevent their use
regardless of context").
36 Id. at 1696-97.
37 MGW Group Inc. v. Gourmet Cookie Bouquets.com., Claim No:
FA0405000273996, (NAF, 2004), available at http://www.brownwelsh.com/
HPLowry-archive/273996.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
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freedom of contract.
C. Law & Economics of Trademark Protection
As with all areas of the law, trademark law has economic
underpinnings. The law and economics expert, Judge Posner, has
explored the economic implications of trademark protection. 38 There
are several economic issues embedded in trademark protection: (1)
search cost reduction for customers; (2) the costs of enforcing
trademark rights; and (3) incentives for manufacturers to improve the
quality of their products.
39
The first economic effect of trademark protection is the
reduction of consumer search costs. According to Judge Posner, once
consumers become familiar enough with the products of various
manufacturers, they begin to associate the trademark with the quality
of the product.4 0 This assumes that trademarks signify consistent
quality. Let's assume a consumer is in the market for toothpaste.
Once he has enough experience with a certain brand, he uses that
brand's trademark as a proxy for the quality of the toothpaste. The
consumer does not have to research various toothpaste brands every
time he runs out. If trademark protection did not exist and anyone
could market his toothpaste under another's name, the consumer
would not trust the brand and would therefore spend considerable
time searching for the right quality.42 Thus, trademark protection
significantly reduces consumer search costs, since consumers do not
have to spend time investigating the attributes of a particular brand
"because the trademark is a shorthand way" of signifying the
consistency of quality.43
Coexistence agreements generally allow similar marks to
exist in the market simultaneously. If, as a result of such agreements,
consumers confuse the source of the goods they buy, they will stop
associating trademarks for that product with a particular standard of
quality. Trademarks will no longer serve as a proxy for the quality
38 See Landes & Posner, supra note 12.
39 Id. at 268-80.
40 Id. at 269.
41 Id. (stating that "[t]he benefits of trademarks reducing consumer search
costs require that the producer of a trademarked tool maintain a consistent quality
over time and across consumers").
42 Id.
43 See Landes & Posner, supra note 12.
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the consumer is used to, and the consumer will stop relying on
trademarks as quality indicators and begin spending more time
evaluating the product for quality. Thus, if coexistence agreements
create customer confusion, the effect of reduced consumer search
costs will be eliminated.
Another economic effect of trademark protection is the cost of
legally enforceable trademarks. 4 These costs are low, at least with
respect to fanciful marks.4a  One argument is that trademark
protection may spur their owners "to create ... a spurious image of
high quality that enables monopoly rents to be obtained by deflecting
consumer from lower-price substitutes of equal or even higher
,,46quality. However, these arguments "have gained no foothold...
in trademark law, as distinct from antitrust law." 47  Even if
consumers sometimes spend more money on a brand-name product
when they could have gotten a store brand for less, the overall effect
of trademark protection is that trademarks lower consumer search
costs and "foster quality control rather than create social waste and
consumer deception. ' 47 As a result of trademark protection,
consumers spend less time searching for products of desired quality,
which enables them to economize on the real costs. 49
This underscores, once again, the importance of reducing
consumer confusion with respect to different brands as much as
possible. To the extent coexistence agreements create such
confusion, they subvert the economic impact of trademark protection
of reducing the costs through reducing the search time for the right
quality of the product.
Finally, trademark protection encourages manufacturers to
invest in maintaining the quality of their product.5 ° Without a legal
right to use a mark exclusively, there would be no benefit in
44 Id. at 273.
45 Id. at 273-74 (stating that the reasons for the low costs with respect to
fanciful marks are that (1) "transfer of the mark is automatically effected by a
transfer of the rights to make the branded product"; (2) there is no rent seeking
associated with staking out a fanciful mark; and (3) the costs of enforcement are
relatively low).
46 Id. at 274.
47 Id. at 274-75.
48 See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 274-75.
49 Id.
'o Id. at 280.
208 [Vol. 18:2
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maintaining consistent quality, since a free-rider could attempt to
pass off his lower-quality product for another's higher-quality
product.5 1 This would mislead consumers into believing they are
buying higher-quality merchandise, when, in fact, that is not the
case. Such deception would, in turn, increase the consumer search
costs, since consumers would no longer be able to rely on the mark as
an indicator of quality.5 3 As a result, "the average quality of the
product as a whole would be lower than with legally enforceable
trademarks. 54
To apply this principle to coexistence agreements, if they
create consumer confusion, then consumers would not be able to rely
on the trademark as quality indicators. This would provide a
disincentive for the manufacturer to maintain a certain level of
quality, which, according to Judge Posner, would lead to the overall
lower quality of the products affected by the coexistence agreement.
55
Thus, if coexistence agreements create consumer confusion,
they will have adverse effects on the economics of trademark
protection. Such agreements, in case of confusion, would increase
consumer search costs and remove the incentives to maintain the
higher product quality.
III. Coexistence Agreements
The International Trademark Association ("INTA") defines a
coexistence agreement as an "[a]greement by two or more persons
that similar marks can coexist without any likelihood of confusion;
allows the parties to set rules by which the marks can peacefully
,,6
coexist.. "5  For example, in 1989, Apple Corps, The Beatles record
label, entered into a coexistence agreement with Apple Computer. 7
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 See Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 280.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 INTA Glossary, available at http://www.inta.org/info/glossary.htmI (last
visited Oct. 13, 2005).
57 Indus. Indem. Co. v. Apple Computer, 79 Cal.App.4th 817, 823 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999); See Johnson Pub. Co., Inc. v. Willitts Designs Int'l Inc., 1998 WL
341618, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (describing a coexistence agreement where parties
agree to each other's use of similar marks if such use is restricted to certain types of
product).
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The agreement acknowledged the "similarity between their respective
Trade Marks" and the parties' wishes to "to avoid confusion between
their respective business activities and to preserve their respective
Trade Mark rights. 58  According to the terms of the agreement,
Apple would not use its name and logo on any computer products
"specifically adapted for use in the recording or reproduction of
music or of performing artist works," and both parties would not
oppose or attempt to cancel the registration of their trademarks.
59
A. Judicial Interpretations of Coexistence Agreements
Various tribunals around the globe weigh the validity of
coexistence agreements differently. The decisions range from
complete reliance on the terms of the agreement, to giving heavy
weight to the agreement, to feeling free to invalidate an agreement if
it is detrimental to public interest. Trademark examination offices
around the world also have their own policies when it comes to
allowing registration of marks for companies who have coexistence
agreements with senior users of confusing marks.
60
In Ron Cauldwell Jewelry Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes Inc., the
petitioner applied for a trademark Eye Candy to be used on fashion
accessories such as belts, handbags, watches, etc.6 1 The respondent
owned a store named Eye Candy where it sold fashion accessories,
but did not use Eye Candy as a trademark.62 The petitioner and the
respondent entered into a coexistence agreement, by which the
respondent would not oppose the petitioner's trademark application
for Eye Candy, and the petitioner would not object to the respondent
using Eye Candy for a store name.63 The respondent opposed
58 Indus. Indem. Co., 79 Cal. App. 4th at 823.
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., http://english.jaw-hwa.com.tw/main.php?ID=a0003&NID=C0007
(stating that Chinese Trademark office "will accept a Letter of Consent or a co-
existence agreement when two marks and their designated goods/services are
similar to each other. However, if two marks and their designated goods/services
are identical to each other, such Letter of Consent or co-existence agreement will
not be accepted").
61 Ron Cauldwell Jewelry Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes Inc., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
2009, 2009 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 2002) available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/foia/ttab/2dissues/2002/121784.pdf, 1
(last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
62 Id.
63 Id.
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petitioner's trademark application, arguing that the contract was
ambiguous and without consideration. 4 The Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board ("TTAB") granted summary judgment to the petitioner
based on the coexistence agreement.65 The TTAB based its decision
solely on the agreement, without considering any outside policy6
questions, such as consumer confusion, injury to public interest, etc.
It viewed the coexistence agreement as a contract, and it only
concerned itself with contractual issues of ambiguity and adequacy of
consideration. 67 Having decided that the contract was unambiguous
on its face and not lacking in consideration, the TTAB had no
difficulty granting summary judgment to the petitioner. 68
In Swatch Group Inc. v. Movado Corp., Swatch sued Movado
for trademark infringement, claiming that Movado's mark
VENTURE infringed on Swatch's mark VENTURA. 69
Unfortunately for Swatch, it had a coexistence agreement with a third
party for an identical mark used for the sale of watches. 70 The court
held that the agreement seriously diluted the distinctiveness of
Swatch's mark VENTURA.7 1  In addition, the court stated that
because the marks coexisted in the market place for four years, and
the consumers of Swatch and Movado watches are sophisticated
buyers, the likelihood of confusion did not exist.
72
In Times Mirror Magazines v. Field & Stream Licenses Co.,
the Second Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the
defendant.73 The plaintiff sued for breach of contract and trademark
infringement and sought cancellation of its coexistence agreements
with the defendant with respect to the "FIELD & STREAM" mark.74
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See Ron Cauldwell Jewelry Inc., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2013.
68 Id.
69 Swatch Group Inc. v. Movado Corp., 2003 WL 1872656, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
70 Id. at *3.
71 Id.
72 Id. at *4.
73 Times Mirror Magazines v. Field & Stream Licenses Co., 294 F.3d 383, 384
(2d Cir. 2002).
74 Id.
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The district court held that claims of trademark infringement, unfair
competition and false designation of origin were precluded by the
coexistence agreement. 75  The plaintiff argued that the agreement
must be rescinded because coexistence of trademarks would "cause
substantial consumer confusion and thus injure the public interest. '76
The district court declined to set aside the contract to protect public
interest.77 The Second Circuit agreed and held that the party seeking
to cancel a coexistence agreement must show that "the public interest
will be significantly injured if the contract is allowed to stand., 78
The showing required to overcome the validity of the agreement is
higher than the likelihood of confusion in trademark infringement
cases. 79 In this case, the harm to the public would be minimal, which
is not sufficient to outweigh the public interest in holding parties
responsible for their contractual commitments.
80
Finally, the Andean Court of Justice placed perhaps the
strongest emphasis on consumers in the resolution of a dispute
between Merrell Pharmaceuticals Inc. ("Merrell") and Allergan Inc.
("Allergan").8' Merrell applied to the Trademark Office for
82
registration of its mark ALLEGRA. Allergan opposed the
registration based on its use of the name ALLERGAN and its
registered marks ALLERGAN, ALLERGAN BOTOX and
ALLERGAN GAS PERM. 83 In support, Merrell cited a coexistence
agreement between itself and Allergan.84  The Andean Court of
Justice held that the coexistence agreement did not make ALLEGRA
per se registrable. 85 The reason was not just the similarity between
the two marks, but also because "the main intention is to protect
15 Id. at 389-90.
76 Id. at 395.
" Id. at 390.
78 Id.
79 Times Mirror Magazines., 294 F.3d at 390.
80 id.
81 The Eleventh Annual Int'l Rev. of Trademark Jurisprudence, 94
TRADEMARK REP. 277, 355-56 (March-Apr. 2004).
82 Id. at 355.
83 id.
84 id.
85 id.
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consumers." 86 That is especially true in the field of pharmaceutical
products "where confusion could generate irreversible damages to
human health., 87 Accordingly, the registration of ALLEGRA was
refused.88
B. Making Sense of Divergent Decisions
Courts and arbitration fora seem to diverge widely in their
decisions. However, each case has its own circumstances to which
the courts respond. In the case of Eye Candy trademark, one of the
parties applied to register Eye Candy as trademark to use on their
merchandise, while the other party simply used it as the name of its
store.8 9 In this case, there was not even a question of trademark
confusion. The Eye Candy store was not a chain; it was a single store
in New York City.90 Nothing sold in the store bore the mark of Eye
Candy, 91 and the possibility of consumer confusion was slight at best.
Even if some people were confused, the overall effect on the public,
the economy and the competition was negligible. Thus, it was
reasonable for TTAB to rely solely on the contract.
In the Swatch case, the court mentioned the effect of
similarity of trademarks on the public, but instead of focusing on the
public interest, it used the public to support its conclusion that there
is no infringement. 92 The members of public in question were
sophisticated customers who paid hundreds of dollars for a watch.93
The court reasoned that before investing a large sum of money into a
watch, such customers would make sure that they are buying what
they want.94 However, the court did not discuss what would happen if
86 See Eleventh Annual Int'l Rev. of Trademark Jurisprudence supra note 81,
at 356.
81 Id. at 355-56.
88 Id.
89 See Ron Cauldwell Jewelry Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes Inc., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
2009, 2011 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 2002) available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/foia/ttab/2dissues/2002/121784.pdf, 1
(last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Swatch Group Inc., 2003 WL 1872656, *4-5.
9' Id. at *4.
94 Id.
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a relatively unsophisticated consumer decided to buy an expensive
watch as a present. For example, if a woman who had never
purchased an expensive watch wanted to buy her boyfriend a Movado
watch, she may not be as discerning as someone who is used to
buying expensive items. Under these facts, not only would the
similarity between Movado and Swatch watches be against public
interest, but so would the coexistence agreement between Swatch and
the third party. The court in Swatch seems either to have assumed
that only sophisticated consumers buy expensive items, or that the
number of unsophisticated people who buy expensive items is
negligible. If the assumption is the latter, then the potential for
confusion becomes minimal, and the coexistence agreement plays a
larger, albeit collateral, role of weakening the distinctiveness of
Swatch's mark.
To move from Swatch to Times Mirror, the court rejected the
plaintiff's assertion that the coexistence agreement should be
invalidated because it violates public policy, but it gave more
consideration to the public.95 By stating that the public interest must
be greater than confusion to invalidate a coexistence agreement, the
court tacitly acknowledged that there are situations where public
interest may prevail over contract enforcement. The court did not
indicate what the circumstances under which a coexistence agreement
violates public policy would be, but it gave the impression that such
circumstances exist. The court also did not identify the standard a
proponent of agreement invalidation must meet in order to prevail.
One possibility is that the industries agreeing to use a confusingly
similar mark must be engaged in a similar trade, but that is unlikely,
since in Swatch v. Movado, both parties were in the watch-making
business, yet the case was decided by the same court as Times
Mirror.
It is possible that the court would be persuaded that the public
interest is important enough to outweigh the contract if the products
in question were affectin6 public health, as was the case in Merrell
Dow Inc. v. Allergan Inc. In Merrell Dow, public interest prevailed
over the interest of enforcing contractual agreements. 97 The parties
95 Times Mirror Magazines v. Field & Stream Licenses Co., 294 F.3d 383, 395
(2d Cir. 2002).
96 Merrell Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Superintendency of Industry and
Commerce, (Proceeding 50 IP 2001) (Andean Court of Justice), at
http://www.comunidadandina.org/normativa/sent/50-IP-2001.htm (last visited Nov.
18, 2005).
97 Id.
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had a coexistence agreement, according to which the defendant
should not have opposed the plaintiffs trademark application.
98
Under the above-discussed precedent (none of which is admittedly
binding), the court should have ruled for the plaintiff. But, unlike
Ron Cauldwell, where the arbitration forum relied solely on the
contract without considering the public interest, 99 the ruling in
Merrell Dow was based solely on public interest, without any weight
given to the contract.100 The difference in facts between these two
cases is obvious: one involved fashion accessories, and the other,
pharmaceutical products. In light of these differences, it is easy to
understand the divergence of outcomes between Ron Cauldwell and
Merrell Dow. Where coexistence agreements potentially affect
public health, courts should question their validity much more
readily.
C. Do Coexistence Agreements Potentially Violate Antitrust
Law?
Coexistence agreements may violate antitrust law. By
entering into such agreements, competitors agree to limit the scope of
the competition, which may implicate antitrust provisions. Below is
the discussion of relevant antitrust law and how it affects coexistence
agreements.
1. Antitrust and Trademark Law
The Sherman Act criminalizes illegal monopolies'01 and
restraint on commerce. 102 Examples of illegal monopolies include
98 Id.
99 See Ron Cauldwell Jewelry Inc. v. Clothestime Clothes Inc., 63 U.S.P.Q.2d
2009, 2022 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 2002) available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/foia/ttab/2dissues/2002/121784.pdf, 1
(last visited Oct. 21, 2005).
100 Merrel Pharmaceuticals Inc., Proceeding 50 IP 2001.
101 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). (stating that "[e]very person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony").
102 Id. § 1. (stating that "[e]very contract... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal").
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price fixing, market share fixing, etc.' 0 3 Courts have applied antitrust
laws to trademark infringement cases.' °4 Generally, it is not an
antitrust violation to sue for infringement, unless the suit is a "sham"
designed to keep legitimate competition off the market.'°5 Similarly,
the law encourages trademarks agreements between competitors that
avoid expensive litigation.1°6 However, if competitors enter into a
trademark agreement that in reality divides the market between two
companies courts would invalidate such an agreement as an antitrust
violation. 1
67
There are two antitrust standards: the per se standard (where
the practice is anticompetitive on its face), and the rule of reason
standard (where anticompetitive effects must be proven with detailed
economic analysis).10 8 Coexistence agreements could fall into either
103 See Susser v. Cavel Corp., 332 F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that
"[e]ven in the absence of express contractual provisions which evidence an
unlawful scheme, a charge of unlawful price-fixing may be substantiated by proof
of a course of conduct by which the seller or licensor effectively maintains control
of the ultimate retail price at which a product is sold").
104 See Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, Inc., 692 F.2d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 1982)
(declining to decide whether filing a .meritorious suit can ever constitute sham
litigation that violates antitrust laws); Alberto-Culver Co. v. Andrea Dumon, Inc.,
466 F.2d 705, 711 (7th Cir.1972) (stating that "plaintiffs good faith effort to
enforce its copyright and trademark is not the kind of exclusionary conduct
condemned by § 2 of the Sherman Act"); Drop Dead Company v. S.C. Johnson &
Son, Inc., 326 F.2d 87, 96 (9th Cir.1963) (registering multiple marks for wax
products, mass advertising, mass sales and bringing of colorable infringement suits
are lawful acts which do not "constitute the sort of aggressive competition and
promotion that anti-trust law seeks to protect, particularly within the limits of
lawful monopolies granted by Congress").
105 Shinder I. Jeffrey, Role of Antitrust, 785 TRADEMARK & ANTITRUST LAW
7, 22-24 (2004).
106 See Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 61 (2d Cir.1997)
(holding that a trademark agreement between the parties did not violate antitrust
law, because the agreement did not prevent plaintiff from making a disinfectant; it
simply prevented plaintiff from using the mark PINE-SOL on its disinfectant; thus,
no illegal monopoly existed).
107 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 606
(1951) (stating that an agreement that serves to divide markets between competitors
is illegal per se under antitrust law).
108 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (setting
out the elements of 15 U.S.C. §2). In order to prove impermissible monopoly,
plaintiff must show "l) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market,
and 2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from
growth or development as a consequence of a superior product-, business acumen,
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category, depending on the terms of the agreement. For instance,
parties could not enter legally into an agreement that prohibits one of
them from making a certain product.'
0 9
Thus, although the law encourages competitors to enter into
agreements in order to avoid expensive litigation and most trademark
agreements do not violate antitrust law, some agreements could
potentially create illegal monopolies or restraint of trade. As the
Clorox court stated, "the goal is to determine whether restrictions in
an agreement among competitors potentially harm consumers.""
l 0
Below is a discussion of the line competitors may not cross in
entering into trademark agreements.
2. Apply Coexistence Agreements' Effects on Consumers to
Antitrust Law
As shown by the cases described above,"' the main effect of
coexistence agreements on consumers is the potential for confusion.
Taking it to the broadest extreme, in some cases, coexistence
agreements may lead to such blurring of the differences between
various brands that consumers will come to view them as the same
brand. This is more likely to happen with everyday goods than with
luxury goods, since luxury goods consumers are more discerning."1
2
Even with luxury goods, however, although pre-sale confusion is less
likely, post-sale confusion is just as probable as with everyday goods,
since the contingent of the relevant population includes the
unsophisticated as well as the sophisticated consumer.
The question then becomes, if widespread confusion results
from a coexistence agreement allowing confusingly similar marks to
exist in the market, is this the kind of agreement that was proscribed
by antitrust law? The purpose of antitrust law is to encourage
competition and prevent companies from creating barriers to entry
into a trade. Thus, the answer to the question would depend on
whether an agreement between competitors with similar marks would
result in a virtual monopoly preventing others from entering the
market for similar goods. If no barrier is created, then there is no
antitrust violation; conversely, if others find it impossible to enter the
or historic accident." Id.
109 See Jeffrey supra note 105 and attached notes.
"0 Clorox, 177 F.3d at 56.
... See infra Part 111(a).
"'2 Swatch, 2003 WL 1872656, at *1.
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market for similar goods, then antitrust law is violated.
Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc.113 sheds light on this
issue. In that case, the plaintiffs and the defendant's predecessors
entered into a trademark agreement prohibiting Clorox from making
certain products under the name PINE-SOL. Clorox sued Sterling,
alleging that the agreement violated antitrust law, since it created a
barrier to entry into the market of disinfectants." 5  The court,
however, rejected Clorox's claim and held that the agreement did not
violate antitrust law." 6 The court pointed out that a trademark does
not confer monopoly on the idea, but rather "a right to a name
only." ' 1 7 Thus, the agreement between Clorox and Sterling did not
prevent Clorox from making a disinfectant; it prevented Clorox only
from using the name PINE-SOL on its disinfectants." 8 The court
stated that the "antitrust laws protect consumers by prohibiting
agreements that unreasonably restrain overall competition; thus, in
order to fulfill the requirement of showing an actual adverse effect in
the relevant market, 'the plaintiff must show more than just that he
was harmed by the defendant's conduct."" 9
Clorox also asserted that its inability under the agreement to
use the name PINE-SOL in its disinfectant effectively prevented it
from competing with Sterling.' 20 However, the court was not moved
by this argument; it stated that "antitrust laws do not guarantee
competitors the right to compete free of encumbrances ... so long as
competition as a whole is not significantly affected."' 12 1
The Clorox decision illustrates that the threshold for proving
that a trademark agreement creates a monopoly is high. 12
113 Clorox, 117 F.3dat 50.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id._at 56.
118 Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56.
"9 Id. at 57 (quoting K.M.B. Warehouse Distrib., Inc. v. Walker Mfg.Co., 61
F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995)).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 59.
122 Id. at 57 (stating that "because the antitrust laws protect competition, not
competitors, .... and trademarks are non-exclusionary, it is difficult to show that an
unfavorable trademark agreement raises antitrust concerns").
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Trademark agreements are almost presumptively valid under antitrust
law, and even if as a result of an agreement one competitor acquires a
tremendous market power, that power is insufficient to invalidate the
agreement. 123 Even if a party is effectively barred from introducing
its product as a result of an agreement, antitrust law is not implicated
as long as someone can introduce a similar or identical product under
a different mark.' 24 Thus, a coexistence agreement would violate
antitrust law only if, as a result, no one can enter the market for the
same type of product. Therefore, consumer confusion, while an
important policy consideration in analyzing the validity of
coexistence agreements, does not render such agreements illegal
under antitrust law.
D. Even in the Absence of Antitrust Violation, Do Coexistence
Agreements Limit or Decrease the Competition Among the
Parties to Such Agreements?
Even in the absence of antitrust violations, coexistence
agreements have a potential for stifling the competition. After all,
antitrust law does not prohibit natural monopolies; rather, it prohibits
monopolies formed as a result of collusion between companies for
anticompetitive purposes. Nevertheless, coexistence agreements may
create situations where others find it harder to compete. One of the
instances would be the situation in the Clorox case, where Clorox
could not use the mark PINE-SOL for its disinfectants. While they
could introduce the same product under a different mark, the success
of the product would not be nearly as great, because the mark PINE-
SOL already had a consumer base, and Clorox would not have to
invest as much money into marketing the brand and educating the
consumer about the PINE-SOL brand. Below is a discussion of the
effect of coexistence agreements on competition.
1. Effect of Coexistence Agreements on Marketing
Expenditure and Resulting Price Effects
In some situations, a coexistence agreement may not restrict
competitors from introducing products under a certain brand; an
agreement may be a simple covenant not to sue for trademark
infringement. 2 For example, if two fashion accessories companies
123 Clorox, 117 F.3d at 59.
124 Id.
125 Before arriving at such an agreement, competitors would probably try
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with similar trademarks enter into that type of a coexistence
agreement, each may find that it spends less money on the marketing
of its brand, since consumers who are unable to differentiate between
the brands would view both companies' advertising as one and the
same. If the trademarks and the type of goods are quite similar, one
company's commercials would create the demand for both
companies' products. This would be truer with lower-end products
where many of the consumers are not sophisticated, and the
consumer pool is larger.
The upside of companies spending less money on marketing
and advertising would be decreased prices. If companies save
money, they might pass the savings to the consumers in an effort to
win them over. If that result materializes, coexistence agreements
would benefit the consumers from an economic standpoint.
On the other hand, coexistence agreements between
companies with similar trademarks and products may increase the
competition. Now that neither company can sue for infringement and
force the other to change its trademark or stop making the same type
of goods, companies may feel that they have to fight harder for
consumers, and spend more money and effort to differentiate
themselves from the other similar brands. This additional
expenditure may lead to increased prices, and the consumer would
suffer. The same result, however, might occur even in the absence of
a coexistence agreement. If companies do not arrive at coexistence
agreements, the same money might be spent in litigation, and the
result would be the same - higher prices to the detriment of
consumers.
2. Effect of Coexistence Agreements on Quality of Products
Another possible effect of coexistence agreements is on the
quality of the product. As was the case with price, quality may go in
either direction. If there is sufficient consumer confusion as a result
of coexistence of two similar marks for similar products, a party to an
agreement may want to take advantage of a competitor's reputation
and devote less effort to maintaining the product's quality. On the
other hand, if a company feels more pressure to differentiate itself
from a competitor in the resulting confusion, it may invest more into
its product quality, advertise the superior quality, and differentiate
itself from the competitor in the mind of the consumer based on the
suing for infringement, or simply decide that litigation would be more expensive
than entering into a coexistence agreement where competitors are not restricted in
what kind of product they can introduce under a certain brand.
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product's quality. The other party to the agreement may feel
compelled to do the same, and the coexistence agreement would have
created more competition between the two than existed before. As
with the price effect, the consumers would be affected in either
scenario, but it is not clear that the price and quality effects are
predictable. It is possible that, with price and quality variables,
different companies will choose to behave differently even with
similar coexistence agreements.
IV. Conclusion
It is not clear how coexistence agreements affect consumers.
Much would depend on whether and to what extent coexistence
agreements create consumer confusion. The greater the potential for
confusion, the greater the possibility .that consumers would be
affected by a coexistence agreement. The potential for confusion
would depend on several factors: (1) whether the parties to an
agreement produce luxury goods consumed mostly by sophisticated
consumers who are less prone to confusion; (2) the similarity of the
trademarks subject to a coexistence agreement (the more similar the
marks, the greater the potential for confusion); and (3) the similarity
of the products subject to a coexistence agreements (the more similar
the products, the greater the potential for confusion). The second and
third factors must be taken together to get a more precise evaluation
for the potential for confusion: if the trademarks and the products are
similar, then the confusion is likely to be much greater than if only
the trademark or the product subject to an agreement were similar.
In evaluating coexistence agreements for adherence to public
policy considerations, the courts should balance the welfare of
consumers with freedom and sanctity of contracts. The triggering
factor would be likelihood of confusion: if there's a potential for
confusion, then a court should evaluate a coexistence agreement for
violation of public policy. Courts should judge the legitimacy of the
agreements on a sliding scale. On one end of the spectrum would be
agreements affecting fashion items where confusion would not lead
to public disasters like purchasing wrong medication. This is the Eye
Candy type of situation where the court relied on the agreement
without giving any consideration to the possibility of confusion or
public interest. On the other extreme would be agreements affecting
serious issues like public health. In this situation, as in Merrell Dow,
courts should afford little deference to the parties to the agreement
and strongly consider public interest in scrutinizing a coexistence
agreement. The similarity of the marks should also be a factor in
2005]
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considering the legitimacy of the agreement. The more similar the
marks are, the less deference the parties should get. If the trademarks
are largely identical, the agreement should be invalidated. For
practical purposes, the stronger the brand, the more protective its
owner will be, and even if a strong-branded company entered into a
coexistence agreement with a competitor who owns a very similar
mark, the company with a strong brand will invest a lot of effort in
differentiating itself from the competitor and thus prevent consumer
confusion.
Additionally, consumers should be able to petition the PTO
for trademark cancellation if coexistence of confusingly similar
marks pose a threat to public welfare. The PTO evaluation should be
the same as that of the courts described above.
Thus, public welfare would be protected from harmful
coexistence agreements by two avenues of possible attack. One of
them is a consumer petition to the PTO for a cancellation of one of
the confusingly similar marks. The other is a competitor suing
directly in court to invalidate an agreement that allows coexistence of
confusingly similar marks. As stated above, both the PTO and the
courts should overrule the parties' right to freedom of contract only
in the event of a significant detriment to public interest, such as
public health.
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